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ABSTRACT 
In agriculture there has been a long history of using a levy or an insurance premium to create mutual funds to 
mediate economic risks to growers due to environmental variability and quarantine pests.  In the United States the 
federal government, through the USDA, continues to underwrite funds (collected by private insurance agents) which 
are used to protect contributors from the effects of extreme weather and pest and disease losses.  In Europe mutual 
funds such as the Kartoffelafgiftsfonden in Denmark and Potatopol in the Netherlands have been developed to 
mediate risks from some potato diseases in different ways.  This paper uses established methods of economic risk 
management from agriculture and applies these to marine fisheries to demonstrate how financial risks could be 
mediated by the creation of insurance funds.  Through the use of probabilistic estimates of future catches and prices, 
and the risk of depletion across various scenarios, we investigate how government and industry participation in 
creating and managing funds may encourage increased protection of fisheries, and compliance and enforcement for 
fishery regulations.  The paper also explores how fund exposure may be reduced by the application of reinsurance 
from commercial insurers for the upper tail of high cost, low probability events, such as total fishery collapse.  
Keywords: capture fishery, insurance, risk, revenue, price, harvest, indemnity, premium 
INTRODUCTION 
Uncertainty  affects  the  behavior  of  fishermen  and  fisheries  regulators  in  a  way  that  can  negatively  affect  the 
sustainability of  fish stocks and fisheries income and productivity. Faced  with financial risks, fishermen  might 
overexploit resources in the short term, thereby contributing to even greater financial uncertainties in the future.  
Insurance may provide a tool to address uncertainty in a way that would help fishermen and regulators achieve 
objectives of sustainability, income and productivity.  However, the nature of fisheries risk may determine what 
forms of insurance are appropriate, and there are some constraints on the potential benefits from insurance. 
Insurance mechanisms have long been used to mitigate financial risks presented by environmental and biosecurity 
uncertainties in agriculture.  However, the sources of uncertainty that can adversely affect fisheries are manifold and 
often more difficult to define, predict and assess.  Whereas the factors that affect agricultural outputs are often 
evident: the weather, pest infestations, disease outbreaks, etc, the question of what caused the decline in fisheries in 
most cases is impossible to answer with the same degree of confidence.  Risks in agriculture are often heterogeneous 
over large areas, whereas fisheries risks may often apply to the whole stock.  Many fish stocks are cyclical due to 
climatic and ecological factors, while others exhibit variability due to fluctuations in recruitment success, mortality, 
and  migration.  Continued  exploitation  can  itself  lead  to  greater  variability  in  stock  dynamics.    An  ever  larger 
component of the risks to  which the  fishing industry is  exposed comes  from  the socio-economic and political 
spheres via hard to predict and plan for prices, costs, labor availability and regulation. 
The EC Framework 6 project PRONE, of which this work forms a part, is intended to address issues of risk in 
marine fisheries.  A principal objective of the project is to adapt risk analysis theory and practice to European 
fisheries  and  to  demonstrate  a  variety  of  tools  to  manage  their  risks.    It  also  aims  to  develop  improved  risk 
management  mechanisms  that  ensure  that  the  outputs  of  risk  assessments  are  catalogued  and  the  management 
options available are adequately understood by stakeholders through effective risk communication.  IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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Governments worldwide are heavily involved in regulating fisheries and yet few of these fisheries can be described 
as being both ecologically and economically sustainable.  Insurance has proved a useful tool in mitigating risks and 
promoting sustainability in agriculture. This paper reviews the case for some applications of fisheries insurance and 
uses a stochastic simulation modelling approach to test the principles of an example insurance regime applied to a 
herring-like stock.  Insurance may be a practical tool in some specific cases.  Insurance has an advantage over many 
other options to reduce uncertainty because it can affect fishing behavior directly, and could provide quick feedback 
based on fishermen’s immediate perceptions, while regulatory approaches rely on slow and often unreliable data. 
The first part of the paper describes the initial results of the PRONE project analysis of using insurance to reduce 
risks in a modeled wild capture fishery by drawing on experiences in agriculture and contains an overview of the 
work of others in this field.  The brief review is followed by a description of a framework in which an example 
insurance scheme is tested.  The PRONE project is considering a full range of possible insurance schemes but in this 
paper only one is illustrated.  The example not only demonstrates benefits of insurance but also some difficulties 
presented by an insurance scheme and how stochastic simulations may be used to identify potential solutions or 
limitations.  Outputs of the insurance model are discussed and the direction of future work is presented. 
REVIEW 
In agriculture there are a number of examples of insurance being used to mediate financial risks to farmers.  The 
Risk Management  Agency (RMA) of the United States Department of  Agriculture (USDA) provides insurance 
cover for over $67 billion of agricultural risk annually in the United States (up 60% since 2003), with more than one 
million voluntary subscribers growing over 100 insured commodities.  The program offers a range of policy options 
to subscribers, who can insure against variation in price, yield or revenue, at a range of thresholds, with reference to 
either their own or local county average values over recent years.  The indemnity is underwritten by the USDA and 
administered through a network of private insurance agents contracted to the RMA.  The program has operated in a 
steadily evolving form since 1938.  It constitutes a significant subsidy to American agriculture, but also requires as a 
condition of insurance that good agricultural practice is followed by farmers and requires that the regulator obtains 
good statistical information on risks and effectively manages public good actions [1].  
In the Netherlands, an industry based agricultural insurance scheme has been used to mitigate financial risk caused 
by the specific risks posed by the introduction of two potato diseases new to the country: potato brown rot (PBR) 
and potato ring rot (PRR).  For two years in the mid 1990s the government provided compensation for outbreaks of 
these diseases but drew the line after the second year of high outbreaks. Government continued to support research 
and regulation, which has contributed to a dramatic fall in PBR outbreaks and helped make the capped insurance 
scheme  viable.    The  growers  initiated  the  insurance  scheme  called  Potatopol  in  1997  [2,3].    Potatopol  is  an 
incorporated non-profit entity operated by potato growers and a small professional management staff.   Government 
assisted the scheme with an initial grant of €250,000 to help establish the program.  Growers pay an annual premium 
based on their potato area, potato market sector (seed, ware or starch) and coverage levels (standard cover or 30% 
+/- standard).  Part of the contractual agreement is that if, in a bad year, there is particularly high demand on the 
fund then subscribers may be obliged to make an additional payment to the fund, with a fixed maximum.  Recent 
levels of outbreaks have not required top-up payments, but growers know that their maximum exposure is limited 
[3].   If there is a particularly bad year and the fund, despite emergency premiums from subscribers, is still unable to 
cover the necessary outlay then Potatopol makes use of commercial reinsurance to ensure all indemnities are paid.  
Commercial reinsurance premiums are paid out of the annual subscriptions.  The fund is capped at a predetermined 
level, commensurate with likely risk, and any excess money remaining in the fund at the end of the year is returned 
pro rata to the subscribers.   Certain risk reducing activities are stipulated in the contract, including an undertaking 
not to irrigate with water declared infected with PBR and, following an outbreak, the soil must not be reused for 
potato growing for at least four years.  Compensation payments are limited to the loss of crop in the year of an 
outbreak, and do not cover subsequent loss of use for potato growing.  The scheme has been running since 1997, 
with approximately 95% of seed growers, 40% of ware growers, and 75% of starch growers participating.   
Denmark also has had concerns about PBR and PRR. There is no government compensation available, but growers 
are supported through a fund (Kartoffelafgiftsfonden) set up by the Danish Potato Council (Specialudvalget for 
Kartofler)  [2,  4].  The  fund  is  administered  by  farmers,  the  Potato  Council  and  government.  Growers  pay  a 
compulsory  levy  of  approximately  €0.54  per  tonne  of  potatoes  sold,  which  is  collected  by  the  firms  that  buy IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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potatoes. The fund raises about €540,000 a year on approximately one million tonnes of production. Compensation 
from the fund is set at 60% of costs faced by a grower due to an outbreak, but only covers costs (lost crop and 
destruction costs, but not replacement seed) borne in the initial year (as in the Netherlands Potatopol programme).  
By 2004, a group of insurance companies offered additional insurance to potato growers to cover the proportion of 
the loss from 60% up to 90% of the first year costs, and including the costs for buying new seed in the following 
year. The insurance costs €20 per hectare of potatoes, and 10% of potato farmers have taken out this insurance.  The 
potato compensation fund also does not carry over unspent funds, but, unlike Potatopol, surpluses are invested in 
potato research carried out by public and private institutions competing for the funds. So far, the fund has not been 
depleted by claims in any year.      
The  rationale  for  the  government  support  of  insurance  schemes  in  agriculture  could  also  apply  to  fisheries.  
Insurance might promote sustainability in fisheries, encourage best practice, protect the industry and employment in 
the sector, and help ensure that ecological goals are met by designing insurance policies directed to such objectives.  
Given the similarity of privately owned aquaculture to agriculture we should expect that insurance schemes would 
be applied to aquaculture before they are extended to wild capture fisheries and, indeed, insurance in aquaculture is 
already widespread [5].   Many fishing risks have, and continue to be, covered by insurance including vessel, gear 
and  crew  safety  policies.    However  the  application  of  insurance  to  catch,  price  and  revenue  variation  is  more 
problematic in wild fisheries, which explains the paucity of examples in the literature.  The harvests of several 
specific marine fisheries are already covered in Japan by a government backed Mutual Insurance Scheme where 
their aim is to maintain a viable industry to secure production capacity. The scheme enables fishermen to share risks, 
shielding  individual  fishermen  from  ruin  caused  by  natural  disasters  and  other  uncertainties.    However,  the 
distinguishing feature of these fisheries is that the species are, like aquaculture, geographically well defined and 
contained:  such  as  kelp,  sedentary  shellfish,  algae,  etc  [6].    The  following  section  summarizes  two  important 
published studies concerning the application of insurance to genuinely  wild capture, common resource,  mobile 
fisheries; the first is a theoretical application of insurance theory by Donald Ludwig and the second is a more 
applied approach in which the USDA considered extending RMA crop insurance principles to wild Sockeye Salmon 
in Bristol Bay, Alaska. 
Theoretical application of insurance to wild fisheries 
In “A quantitative precautionary approach” Ludwig [7] begins with the premise that fisheries management needs to 
be precautionary, which is a fundamental assumption of the PRONE project as well.  He builds on the idea that taxes 
and charges can be better instruments in achieving risk averse management of fisheries than direct regulations (such 
as TAC or effort control) by demonstrating the utility of insurance with some simple models.  The insurance regime 
Ludwig considers is mandatory, as one of the objectives of an insurance regime as conceived by Ludwig, is to place 
an extra burden on the fishermen: in this context the fishermen are creating risks (of stock collapse) which are borne 
by the general public and requiring fishermen to purchase insurance would partly shift the risk burden back onto the 
generators  of  risk.    Ludwig  does  not  consider  designing  an  insurance  scheme  according  to  the  needs  of  the 
fishermen, but rather as a tool to neutralize the hazard that excessive fishing effort can be to an ecosystems.  He 
claims that a bond or insurance regime can achieve several objectives. The key points are summarized in Table I. 
Ludwig uses a stochastic surplus production model with three different harvest control rules: constant harvest rate, 
constant catch, and adjusting harvest rate based on abundance level in order to obtain a target catch.  He claims that 
the main difficulties with setting up an insurance regime are political, institutional and philosophical and that sound 
actuarial calculations can be made for fisheries.  He does not substantiate this last claim; however the Management 
Strategy Evaluation (MSE) approach would allow the equivalent of an actuarial basis, since management is based on 
modeled populations rather than real population attributes [8].  Thus, if response behavior of both fish stocks and 
fishing effort can be accurately modeled in the MSE approach, it would form a suitable foundation on which to add 
insurance as a management component. 
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Table I:  Summary and Comments on Ludwig’s Paper 
Ludwig’s points  Observations 
Prevent  risky  exploitation  by 
increasing  the  costs  through 
premiums  which  are  proportional 
to risks, hence rendering the most 
risky activities unprofitable.   
Insurance may keep fishermen in business that otherwise would have been 
forced to leave. 
Shift  the  risk  burden  from  the 
public to the fishermen – “polluter 
pays principle”. 
Punitive insurance premiums, as envisioned by Ludwig, will not necessarily 
lead to greater social  fairness. It is  not always possible to determine  who 
within  an  industry  is  causing  the  loss,  or  how  much,  so  everyone  in  the 
industry pays, even if they do not cause loss.  
A clear link between a harvesting 
strategy and a premium would alter 
the behaviour of the fishermen and 
make  them  less  likely  to  cause 
harm  to  the  stocks  and  the 
ecosystem. 
In  theory,  modeling  approaches  such  as  risk  assessments  or  management 
strategy  evaluations  can  be  useful  in  linking  the  size  of  premiums  to 
harvesting strategies.  But the potential effectiveness of insurance to influence 
behavior of fishermen is unknown. The difficulties of monitoring activities at 
sea could make fisheries insurance less effective than agricultural insurance at 
lowering risks through its influence on individual behavior. 
The assessment of risk depends on 
the state of knowledge, so charging 
for  risk  would  provide  financial 
incentives  for  industry  sponsored 
research. 
Knowledge,  particularly  the  ability  to  predict  future  harvest,  creates  a 
problem  for  insurance  by  enabling  fishermen  to  “fish”  the  insurance  by 
purchasing the cover in anticipation of payouts.  On the other hand, there is 
no guarantee that obtainable knowledge would be useful enough to reduce 
insurance premiums.  A final case, in theory, could be that information would 
obviate the need for insurance by effectively eliminating risk. 
Sockeye Salmon Case Study  
In 2001 the RMA of the USDA contracted the University of Alaska Fairbanks Agricultural and Forestry Experiment 
Station to scope a pilot crop insurance program for the Bristol Bay commercial salmon fishery [9].  It represents the 
first attempt to extend USDA crop insurance to wild fisheries.  The draft report concluded that until the fishery 
reaches stability, it would be difficult to design and administer an insurance policy that would benefit the industry.  
As a result an insurance program was not set up. However, the initial design phase identified many practical issues 
regarding guarantees, insurance triggers and indemnity payouts that are relevant to the design of potential insurance 
schemes in other wild fisheries.  
The Salmon study draws some important differences between risk factors and insurance schemes in agriculture and 
wild fisheries.  The RMA identifies three important components for crop insurance, namely peril, moral hazard and 
adverse selection: 
•  In agriculture, peril is defined as unanticipated/unavoidable events that affect some outcome, such as low yields 
caused by bad weather, fire, and uncontrollable pest losses, etc.  In fisheries, the definition of peril needs to be 
modified  since  it  is  difficult,  perhaps  impossible,  to  develop  a  sound  actuarial  basis  to  determine  the 
contributory effect of natural events to catches in any given year.  For this reason the authors suggested that 
peril in wild fisheries should be redefined as an outcome: low catches or low fishery exvessel revenues rather 
than identifiable causes.   
•  Avoiding moral hazard, defined by the RMA as an action taken by producers to maximize return from the 
insurance product by limiting their production of the insured crop, requires good risk insurance design to avoid 
incentives for harvesters to “fish” the insurance.  Good design would likewise ensure that insurers were able to 
differentiate  between  legitimate  and  illegitimate  claims  and,  conversely,  prevent  insurers  from  rejecting 
legitimate claims.  A marine fishery equivalent to “best agricultural practice” was not easy to define, which 
would make it difficult for loss adjusters to identify causes and weights of contributing factors.  For these 
reasons,  individual  performance  based  guarantees  were  rejected  and  various  group  based  catch-per-effort 
triggers were simulated in their deterministic catch and price history insurance simulations. 
•  The third RMA component, adverse selection against the insurance provider, occurs when the insured person 
has better knowledge of the relative risk of a particular situation than does the insurance provider.  In fisheries, 
harvests are dependent on biological phenomena.  In the Salmon case-study, run strength over time may be 
correlated with previous events and thus, to some extent, could be predictable.  Fishermen may be able to IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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predict insurable events in years when poor runs were expected which would be a severe compromise to a 
sound risk insurance program.  A multiple year obligation to subscribe to the insurance product was suggested 
as a possible solution. 
Unlike in crop insurance,  the insurable  units in  fisheries are rarely  homogeneous: fishing opportunities do not 
determine individual performance.  For this reason the report suggested that indemnity payouts should be paid based 
on Average Performance Histories (APH) of individual fishermen within the fleet so that, in poor years, they would 
be compensated commensurately  with their fishing performance in previous years, assuming similar effort was 
demonstrated. 
The sockeye salmon fishery in Alaska was suffering from poor prices at the time of the study as a result of other 
salmon species gaining favor in the Japanese market.  As a result the Bristol Bay fishermen desired revenue based 
triggers so they would be covered for poor catches and/or lower prices.   
The report raised the concern that insurance could interfere with the effort to reduce capacity in the fishery by 
essentially subsidizing fishermen that would otherwise leave either permanently or temporarily. 
MODELLING METHODS   
Model structure  
A  stochastic population dynamics  model of a herring-like stock  was developed to illustrate how the economic 
stability of a fishery can be affected by an insurance regime. This model allows us to explore, quantitatively, the 
links  between  risks  introduced  through  either  environmental,  or  knowledge  related,  uncertainties  versus  risk 
introduced  through  implementation  of  fisheries  management,  and  the  scale  of  insurance  premium  required  to 
mediate the risk.   
The insurance policies modeled here are based on systems employed in agricultural risk management, such as the 
RMA of USDA. Harvest shortfalls are covered at selected price levels. Indemnity payments are triggered when the 
harvest falls below the covered proportion of an historical average harvest (for example, the previous ten years).  
The size of an insurance payment depends on an agreed price coverage level,  modeled as a proportion of the 
preceding average price. 
We calculate the size of a premium needed to guarantee that the insurance fund is sufficient to cover losses after the 
first 10 years of operations in 75% of the simulations. The most extreme 25% of the simulations are assumed to be 
covered by reinsurance; a premium charged for re-insurance is calculated separately.  During the first 10 years of 
operation the fund is allowed to borrow money at 8% interest.  Insurance funds can earn 5% annual interest when 
not used to make payments.  The introduction of reinsurance to the model deviates from the Salmon insurance 
example and simulates the Potatopol use of reinsurance to limit fund exposure to high cost/low probability events. 
The model is stochastic and the variability of its predictions can be controlled by changing the standard deviation of 
the  parameters  representing  biological  or  fishermen’s  behavior-related  uncertainty.    The  model  is  designed  to 
explore ideas related to insurance, building on the theoretical framework suggested by Ludwig [7].  We use an age-
structured model, with a stochastic stock-recruitment Beverton and Holt type relationship.  Prices are considered 
elastic with respect to the supply of fish [10].  The parameters of the stock-recruitment relationship are based on 
Bayesian hierarchical meta-analysis of the herring stocks [11].  Other parameter values, such as maturity, mortality 
and weights at age are based on ICES stock assessments. 
Population model description 
The model is implemented in R using three-dimensional arrays storing numbers of herring in billions by age, year 
and simulation.  Before beginning the insurance regime we assume that the stock has been exploited similarly for 
100 years to establish a historical record of population trends. The harvest is assumed to occur in the beginning of IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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the modeled year, and spawning in the middle, the age of recruitment is taken to be 1:         
s y a s y a s y a H N C , , , , , , * = ,            (Eq. 1) 
where C stands for catch (in billions of fish), N for number of herring (in billions of fish), and H for harvest rate; 
∑ =
a
s y a s y a s y W C Y , , , , , * ,          (Eq. 2) 
Yield is given in millions of tonnes, where W is the weight (kg) of individual fish at age; 
) * exp( ) ( , , , , , , , , t M C N N s y a s y a s y a s t y t a   − − =   +   + ,    (Eq. 3) 
 where  t    is equal to ½ or half a year and M is an instantaneous natural mortality rate; 
( ) ∑   +   + =
a
s y a s y a s t y t a s y W Mat N SSB , , , , , , , * * ,       (Eq. 4) 
spawning stock biomass (in millions of tonnes) is denoted by SSB, Mat stands for proportion of sexually mature 
herring by age; 
s y
s y s
s y s
s y SSB
SSB
N ,
,
,
, 1 , 1 *
*
ε
β
α
+
= + ,            (Eq. 5) 
the above stochastic stock recruitment relationship gives the number of age 1 herring for the following year, where 
alpha and beta are Beverton and Holt recruitment function parameters and epsilon is a log-normally distributed 
process error with specified precision (Fig. 1).  Population dynamics of herring (and fish in general) is largely driven 
by the variability in recruitment success from year to year.  The parameters of the stock recruitment function are 
based on the estimates of the recruitment relationship for the Norwegian Spring Spawning herring; the recruitment 
time series for Norwegian Spring Spawning herring for the last 57 years are included in the figure below displaying 
a random modeled trajectory for a herring-like stock over a sample period of the same length.  
For the older groups, transition from year to year is modeled by:  
) * exp( , , , , , 1 , 1 t M N N s y a s t y t a s y a   − =   +   + + +       (Eq. 6) 
We assume that prices are influenced by the amount of supply (catch) and the price flexibility coefficient is taken to 
be -0.25 [10]: 
25 . 0
,
,
, , ) (
*
−








=
s y
s y
a s y a Y mean
Y
P P
,         (Eq. 7) 
where P stands for price. For insurance calculations we use average price per kg of catch, rather than an age specific 
price: IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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Figure 1. The line represents a random recruitment trajectory alongside the estimated recruitment time-series for the 
Norwegian spring spawning stock for 1951 to 2007 (data are shown as points) 
For the purposes of illustrating the functioning of the insurance regime, we simulate 1000 iterations over 30 years 
for each scenario.  For this time period, we calculate the size of the insurance payouts for 80% harvest, 100% price 
coverage policy; that is, compensation would be triggered if catch falls below 80% of average and price below 100% 
of average.  We use the same format for a range of price and harvest thresholds of 60%, 80% and 100% of the 
rolling 5 year average for price and harvest. 
First, for each year and iteration we calculate the average yield for the preceding five years: 
) ,..., ( , 1 , 6 , s y s y s y Y Y mean Y − − = .          (Eq. 9) 
The trigger, s y T , , for insurance payment is based on the average  yield,  s y Y , , and on the coverage level selected, 
which we assume for now is 80%: 
s y s y Y T , , * % 80 = ..            (Eq. 10) 
If the simulated harvest  s y Y , is below s y T , , then an insurance payment  s y IP , is made of the size depending on the 
price coverage level specified in the insurance plan (here 100%) and the average of price per kg over the last five 
years: 
* % 100 * ) ( , , , s y s y s y Y T IP − = ) ,..., ( , 1 , 5 s y s y P P mean − − .    (Eq. 11) IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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To  calculate  the  premium  we  use  a  search  algorithm  that  finds  the  minimum  premium  required  such  that  the 
insurance  fund  raised  is  sufficient  to  cover  up  to  the  75
th  percentile  value  of  the  annual  payouts  over  all  the 
simulated scenarios.  The insurance fund is capped, so that the annual premium payments are suspended while the 
fund is at its capped value, and the interest earned is returned to policy holders on an annual basis. This is referred to 
as the mutual fund.  During the first 10 years the fund is allowed to borrow money if needed at 8% interest, 
conversely the money not used for payouts is invested at 5% annual rate of interest (Fig. 2).  The operating costs are 
assumed to add 10% to the total collected premium for the mutual fund.  
The upper 25% of liability is covered by commercial re-insurance bought in the market.  The premium for re-
insurance,  Ψ , is calculated by adding a 25% profit margin to the expected annual re-insurance payouts ( s y reIP , , 
total payout less the re-insurance threshold level at the 75
th percentile of annual payouts) in the extreme 25% of the 
simulations: 
25 . 1 * ) ( ,  


 


= Ψ
y
s y
s reIP mean mean        (Eq. 12) 
   
Figure 2.  Building an insurance fund over 30 years in four simulated scenarios, this example assumes 100% 
coverage level for both price and harvest; note that the fund sometimes exceeds the fund cap because of the fixed 
premium level 
RESULTS 
The size of the insurance payout and the corresponding premiums are dependent on the details of the policy chosen. 
The  table  below  describes  the  results  of  calculation  of  premiums  and  reinsurance  premiums  under  different 
combinations of price and harvest coverage levels (CL) assuming the same population dynamics in each scenario. 
For these calculations, insurance payouts are based on the harvest and price averaged over the 5 preceding years 
(Table II).  The average annual revenue in the simulations is €1.74 billion, thus insurance payments depending on 
the policy, constitute 0.4% to 14.1% of the average annual revenue (Table II).  IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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Table III shows fund caps for the mutual fund at various coverage levels note that, because only very low insurance 
payouts were required, the fund cap for the 60% harvest coverage level is very small. 
Table II:  Total Annual Insurance Premiums for Different Levels of Catch and Price Coverage 
Total Expected Annual Premium plus Total 
Reinsurance Premium in € billions/year (and as 
a % of average annual revenue )  
60% Price CL  80% Price CL  100% Price CL 
60%   Harvest CL  0.006 (0.4%)  0.009 (0.5%)  0.011 (0.6%) 
80%   Harvest CL  0.051 (2.9%)  0.068 (3.9%)  0.085 (4.9%) 
100% Harvest CL  0.148 (8.5%)  0.197 (11.3%)  0.246 (14.1%) 
  
Table III:   Calculated Fund Caps for the Mutual Fund at Various Coverage Levels 
Calculated caps for mutual fund at different 
coverage levels (€ billion) 
60% Price CL  80% Price CL  100% Price CL 
60%   Harvest CL  0.000  0.000  0.000 
80%   Harvest CL  0.027  0.036  0.054 
100% Harvest CL  0.439  0.585  0.731 
DISCUSSION 
The size of the payouts and therefore the premiums is influenced by all the factors that contribute to the variability 
in predictions. We can use the model to explore how changing the assumptions regarding the variability of model 
parameters could affect insurance. This is useful because certain sources of uncertainty are indeed controllable: 
knowledge can be improved, reducing uncertainty in the estimates of model parameters; fishing can be controlled so 
as to reduce both the level of exploitation and the variability of harvest rates. We can use the model to investigate 
the benefits of reducing the controllable sources of uncertainty measured by the lowered cost of insurance. 
The focus of an insurance tool varies between fishing industry and fisheries regulators.  For industry the focus is on 
revenue (a product of catch and price) set against individual or fleet average records and effort employed.  A variety 
of fund creation and management options are available including: fixed premium, variable fund; variable premium, 
fixed fund;  invest or return surplus in fund, at various intervals; frequency of premium or fund review; capped or 
uncapped liabilities; reinsure upper tail of liability, or leave unmet, etc.  Our example model has been developed for 
a fixed on/off premium variable fund with capped liabilities (enabled by the use of reinsurance) but any system 
could be simulated and their impacts evaluated.   The model demonstrates how insurance payouts can provide a 
“soft landing” when there are short, sharp declines in harvest (such as in Fig 3b, years 7-9), giving a few years for 
longer term adjustment.  Where there is a long term decline in harvest insurance is not likely to be able to help (Fig 
4).  The level of insurance is important in determining the effect on subscribers; in Fig 3a a 60% harvest threshold 
does not trigger payouts, an 80% threshold holds net revenue level for a few years as harvests fall (Fig 3b), while a 
100% harvest threshold (Fig 3c) results in “over-compensation” for several years, which may send the wrong signal 
to fishermen.  Lower thresholds than those in Fig 4 do not trigger insurance payouts in steadily declining harvests, as 
the average reference base falls at a continuous rate.    In these conditions progressively smaller catches coupled 
with continued premium payments feeding a growing fund would make an insurance scheme highly unpopular.  
This suggests that other forms of fund creation and management shoud be evaluated in future models, such as a 
continuously variable annual premium reassessed each year, or a constant, fixed premium.  
The focus of regulators tends to be towards increasing sustainability of exploitation and thus production. It is likely 
that  the  primary  requirement  of  an  insurance  instrument  would  also  depend  upon  increasing  sustainability  of 
production rather than protecting revenues.  This could be built into an MSE modelling approach to test fisheries 
management actions.  In Figs 3 and 4 the different pairs of graphs demonstrate the potential role of subsidy if 
government bears the cost of insurance subscriptions, which could also give more control to regulators. IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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The insurance model developed here is purely reactive and acts like the Salmon insurance example in which the sole 
purpose is to iron out the lows of revenue for the fishers.  This insurance scheme is not dynamic with respect to the 
stock, so the catch affects the insurance payout but the insurance is not directly tied to biological markers or stock 
management actions and it does nothing to prevent poor catches or reduce risk in catch size in subsequent years.  
Ongoing work will develop a more sophisticated approach where a simulated fishery model can make predictions 
about the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for the coming season and the fleet will subscribe to that TAC enforced at 
different levels.  Should the TAC fall below 60, 80 or 100% (depending on coverage bought) of some average of 
catches over previous years then a pay-out would be triggered that makes up the difference.  In this case insurance is 
assisting the fleet to comply with the TAC which may, without insurance, have caused hardship.  This latter system 
more closely resembles Ludwig’s proposal [7] and is more prospective than the current model since it reduces 
financial risk to fishers each year while satisfying regulators by dampening catch risks from overfishing in future. 
a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b) 
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Figure 3.  Revenue with and without insurance policies (100% price and three levels of harvest coverage levels (a) 
60%; b) 80%; c) 100%) based on 5 year averages 
 
Figure  4.    Revenue  with  and  without  insurance  policy  (100%  price  and  100%  harvest  coverage  levels) IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is a potential setting for a Europe-wide insurance regime.  If all stocks were 
insured in Europe, then at least in a future when structural reforms have taken place and fleet overcapacity is 
eliminated, a universal insurance scheme could be justified.  It might make sense to set up a single-crop insurance 
scheme in agriculture, with discrete homogenous units, but insuring a single fish species may not work where 
fishermen catch more than one species.  Furthermore, it could be expensive, since in a single species fishery risks 
cannot be spread except over time.  The conditions needed for the introduction of insurance should be determined, 
such as the impact of an insurance system on levels of stock health, as in the STECF HCR evaluation.  This paper 
demonstrates the potential application of insurance in fisheries, but shows that there are significant issues related to 
the threshold values that trigger payouts, the level at which funds are capped, and whether premiums are constant, 
variable or fixed.    
CONCLUSIONS 
Insurance has three values: 
•  Reduces  intrinsic  unmanageable  variance,  which  is  worth  a  premium  to  subscribers  (such  as  in  hail 
insurance) 
•  Reduces risk behavior by subscribers, so can alter outcome variance or mean or both (contract compliance 
like crop hygiene, or good agricultural practice)   
•  Increases enforcement or control by regulators (either as a direct party to insurance as an underwriter, like 
RMA;  or  indirectly,  like  political  pressure  on  flood  control  authorities  from  subscribers  facing  high 
insurance costs) 
Fishing is well suited to insurance, since it has fairly high intrinsic variance in outcomes, a propensity to risk 
inducing behavior by fishermen, and a history of ineffective regulation. 
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